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Failure of Complementarity: The Future of the 
International Criminal Court Following the 




February 2011 marked a significant period of change for 
the Libyan people as they united against the Muammar 
Gaddafi regime that had oppressed them for forty-two years.1 
What started as peaceful demonstrations quickly escalated into 
a full-blown civil war. Colonel Gaddafi pledged to go from house 
to house and show no mercy to quell the dissent.2 Gaddafi, 
assisted by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (“Saif”), Gaddafi’s heir 
apparent, and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi, waged a 
brutal war against his citizens.3 On March 23, 2011, NATO 
forces were called in to protect Libyan citizens, and by August 
23, 2011, rebel troops had taken Tripoli and effective control of 
the nation.4 The United Nations Security Council referred the 
situation to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) for 
investigation due to reports of widespread persecution and 
disregard for human life by the Gaddafi regime during the 
uprising.5 The war–torn country now faces the question 
whether its judicial system is capable of providing a fair trial to 
 
       *   J.D. candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. Bethel 
University, 2010. 
 1. See John J. Liolos, Justice for Tyrants: International Criminal Court 
Warrants for Gaddafi Regime Crimes, 35 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 589, 589 
(2012). 
 2. G.J. Knoops, Prosecuting the Gaddafis: Swift or Political Justice?, 4 
AMSTERDAM L.F. 78, 78 (2012). 
 3. See Mark Kersten, No Winners in ICC-Libya Standoff, THE MIDDLE 
EAST CHANNEL (Oct. 8, 2012, 2:50 PM), 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/08/no_winners_in_icc_libya_sta
ndoff. 
 4. See Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future of 
the International Criminal Court through Its Involvement in Libya, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2267, 2269 (2011–12). 
 5. See id. at 2270. 
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the leaders of the Gaddafi regime.6 While the ICC has initiated 
an investigation into the Gaddafi era crimes, Libya believes 
that justice can be delivered domestically and has filed a formal 
Admissibility Challenge disputing the ICC’s jurisdiction to 
investigate or prosecute the matter.7  
This Note seeks to understand the significance of national 
due process in the complementarity regime of the ICC through 
an evaluation of the ICC proceedings surrounding the Libyan 
situation. Part I briefly outlines the structure of the ICC, 
details the role of complementarity in that system, examines 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, and lists the requirements for the 
ICC to declare a case admissible. Part II analyzes the 
Admissibility Challenge raised by Libya and evaluates the use 
of due process violations as grounds for admissibility before the 
ICC. The Note concludes that while domestic due process 
violations do not establish admissibility of a case before the 
ICC on their own, flagrant disregard for fundamental due 
process rights are relevant when evaluating admissibility if the 
violations make the accused more difficult to convict, as is the 
case against Saif. 
 
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”), which effectively established the permanent 
ICC, was signed on July 17, 1998.8 The ICC was created in 
response to a recognized need for an independent and 
permanent criminal court that could help bring those 
committing the most serious crimes against humanity to 
 
 6. See Kersten, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; See Michael P. Scharf, Results of 
Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 
(Aug. 1998), http://www.asil.org/insigh23.cfm (stating that members voted 120 
to 7 to adopt the Rome Statute, whereas the United States, China, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, and Libya voted against its adoption, that the Statute came into 
force on July 1, 2002 and that there are currently 137 signatories and 121 
parties); See also United States of America: Communication, Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, May 6, 2002, C.N.434.2002.TREATIES-21, 
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/11/19981110%2006-
38%20PM/Related%20Documents/CN.434.2002-Eng.pdf (informing the 
Secretary-General that the United States had no legal obligations after 
signing the Statute on December 31, 2000). 
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justice.9 The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to four specific crimes: 
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and the crime of aggression.10 
The Rome Statute firmly establishes that an individual is 
criminally responsible for his or her conduct, regardless of title, 
and holds individuals accountable for violations of the most 
serious crimes that otherwise would often escape punishment.11 
Responsibility extends to individuals who commit a crime by 
themself or jointly; to an individual who orders, solicits, or 
induces a crime or an attempted crime; and to an individual 
who facilitates, aids, abets, or assists the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime.12 An individual who takes 
substantial steps toward committing a crime can be held 
criminally liable by the ICC unless he or she abandons the 
effort or prevents the completion of the crime.13 For the crime 
of genocide, an individual can be held responsible not only for 
his or her actions but also for directly and publicly inciting 
others.14 Conversely, only individuals who are in a position to 
direct or exercise control over state military or political action 
can be held liable for the crime of aggression.15 
In order to eliminate impunity, the ICC has jurisdiction 
over crimes specified in article 5 regardless of status or official 
capacity.16 As such, the ICC’s jurisdiction is not hindered by 
 
 9. Although the international community in the period following the end 
of the Cold War created tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to address crimes committed during a 
specific conflict, consensus remained that a court was needed to deal with such 
issues on a permanent basis. See About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www2.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2012); 
See also Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute 
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction 
Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 1, 2 (2001–02) (“Most commentators believe that a permanent 
International Criminal Court is necessary to ensure that acts of mass murder, 
rape, and torture are not committed with impunity, and individuals 
responsible for such heinous acts and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law are brought to justice and severely punished for their 
crimes.”). 
 10. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 6–8, at 4–9 (listing and defining the 
four crimes under ICC jurisdiction). 
 11. See id. art. 25(2)-(3), at 15–16. 
 12. Id. art. 25(3), at 16. 
 13. Id. art. 25(3)(f), at 16.   
 14. Id. art. 25(3)(e), at 16. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 27(1), at 16 (“This statute shall apply 
equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In 
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traditional state immunities based on official capacity.17 To 
eliminate further impunity, the Rome Statute holds military 
commanders criminally responsible for the acts of their 
subordinate forces.18 In certain situations, superiors in other 
fields can be held responsible for the crimes of their 
subordinates as well.19 
 
A. JURISDICTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over Article 5 crimes in 
three situations: (1) when a State party refers a situation to the 
ICC Prosecutor (“Prosecutor”);20 (2) when the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter refers a situation 
to the Prosecutor;21 or (3) when the Prosecutor initiates an 
investigation of a situation in accordance with Article 15.22 The 
 
particular, official capacity . . . shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a 
ground for reduction of sentence.”). 
 17. Id. art. 27(2), at 16. 
 18. See id. art. 28(a), at 16–17. 
 19. Id. art. 28(b), at 17 (stating that a superior shall be held responsible 
for crimes committed by subordinates under his or her direct control where 
“the superior either knew or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; [t]he crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and [t]he superior failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or 
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities 
for investigation and prosecution.”).   
 20. Id. art. 13(a), at 10. Article 14 further provides: 
A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in 
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court appear to have been committed requesting the 
Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of 
determining whether one or more specific persons should be 
charged with the commission of such crimes. 
As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant 
circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting 
documentation as is available to the State referring the 
situation. 
Id. at 11.   
 21. Id. art. 13(b), at 10. 
 22. See id. art. 13(c), at 10. Allowing the Prosecutor power to initiate an 
investigation on his own was controversial during the drafting of the Rome 
Statute. Proponents believed that the Court’s credibility and independence 
would be improved and pointed out that recent Tribunals had granted the 
Prosecutor that power. Opponents were worried about prosecutorial power and 
wanted measures to hold the Prosecutor accountable. The result was a 
compromise where the Prosecutor required approval from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber before investigating on his/her own. See Gurule, supra note 9, at 11. 
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ICC may only establish jurisdiction through the consent of the 
State where the crime occurred (the territorial State) or the 
State of which the accused is a national (the nationality 
State).23 Consent is imputed to a State when it has ratified the 
Rome Statute.24 The only situation where the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction without State consent is when the Security Council 
has referred the situation regarding a non-party national or 
where a non-party state has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction to 
the specific case in question.25 
Regardless of whether the ICC theoretically has 
jurisdiction over a matter, in practice the principle of 
complementarity embedded in the Rome Statute significantly 
reduces the ICC’s ability to exercise that jurisdiction.26 Under 
the complementarity principle, national courts have primary 
jurisdiction, while the ICC fills the gaps when States are 
unable to prosecute the most serious international crimes or 
have failed to take the initiative.27 Because of this principle, 
“the [ICC] has no jurisdiction over a case when the matter is 
‘being appropriately dealt with by a national justice system.’”28 
 
 23. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 12(2), at 10. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Ademola Abass, The International Criminal Court and Universal 
Jurisdiction, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 349, 352 (2006) (discussing the jurisdiction 
of the ICC); see also Rome Statute, supra note 8, at 10. 
 26. Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The International Criminal Court: 
Bottlenecks to Individual Criminal Liability in the Rome Statute, 12 ANN. 
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 185, 187 (2006) (observing that the compromises 
needed to ratify the Rome Statute which centered on the principle of 
complementarity, significantly diluted the aspirations of the ICC). The first 
express reference to a principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute 
appeared in the 1994 Draft Statute in which the preamble stated that the 
“court is intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems in 
cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective.” 
JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 73–74 (Ruth MacKenzie, et al. eds., 2008). The 
complementarity provisions of the 1994 Draft Statute were regarded as 
insufficient and the Ad Hoc Committee in April 1995 elaborated on the 
principle further. Id. at 76–79. 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at 12 (establishing the criteria for when 
national jurisdiction supersedes the ICC’s jurisdiction); id. art. 17, at 3 (the 
ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”); see id. art 
17, at 2 (“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established 
under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions . . . .”); see also Gurule, supra note 9, at 6–7 (indicating that 
according to the Rome Statute, the proper role of the ICC is to complement 
national court jurisdictions). 
 28. Chibueze, supra note 26, at 191 (quoting WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85 (2d ed. 2004)). 
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The principle of complementarity was included in the Rome 
Statute when the United States and other countries voiced 
concern about national sovereignty.29 In practice, this principle 
forces the ICC to defer to national jurisdiction when 
appropriate.30   
Without the principle of complementarity, the drafters 
were concerned that the ICC would become an international 
appellate court.31 They feared a court with the power to 
disagree with a State’s prosecutorial decisions and exercise de 
novo review.32 As a result, the final text of the statute retains 
significant deference to state sovereignty and limits the ICC’s 
power through the principle of complementarity.33 The 
complementarity structure of the ICC differs substantially from 
the primary jurisdiction that was common in ad hoc tribunals.34 
Because of this structure, some have suggested that the ICC 
has effectively become “a court of last resort.”35 
When the Prosecutor is referred a case, he must notify all 
States that have the ability to exercise jurisdiction before he 
 
 29. See Gurule, supra note 9, at 4–5 (stating that while the United States 
generally supported the creation of the ICC, it refused to ratify the Rome 
Statute because United States military personnel and government officials 
could face liability as a result of unintended civilian casualties during 
international peacekeeping operations). 
 30. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International 
Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 47, 59–60 (2001–02) (noting that the 
complementarity principle was partly an accommodation to the United States’ 
concern that broad ICC jurisdiction would expose U.S. citizens). 
 31. See Gurule, supra note 9, at 9 (“[T]he ICC’s role with respect to 
national criminal jurisdictions would be more analogous to that of a ‘super’ 
international appellate court, vested with de novo review authority, rather 
than a court intended to complement States with primary jurisdiction.”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Jakob Pichon, The Principle of Complementarity in the Cases of 
the Sudanese Nationals Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb before the 
International Criminal Court, 8 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 185, 188 (2008) (“[T]his 
balance may be criticized for being ‘overly concerned with a protection of the 
sovereignty of States.’”). 
 34. Chibueze, supra note 26, at 192 (stating that the tribunals for 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor–Leste, 
and Cambodia have all exercised primary jurisdiction over national courts); 
see Harman van der Wilt & Sandra Lyngdorf, Procedural Obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights: Useful Guidelines for the 
Assessment of ‘Unwillingness’ and ‘Inability’ in the Context of the 
Complementarity Principle, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 39, 39 (2009) (noting that 
whereas the statutes for ad hoc tribunals often dictate that their jurisdiction 
prevails over national courts, the Rome Statute does the reverse). 
 35. Chibueze, supra note 26, at 192. 
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commences an investigation.36 Within one month after the 
Prosecutor’s notice, a State with jurisdiction may inform the 
ICC that it will investigate the matter.37 The Prosecutor must 
defer to the State’s investigation, but can petition the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to authorize the ICC’s investigation.38 Because the 
Prosecutor must comply with the State’s request to investigate, 
the request is more a “demand or an assertion by the State of 
its right to primacy.”39 In effect, States can undermine the 
ICC’s jurisdiction and potentially shield their nationals from 
accountability simply by informing the Prosecutor of their 
desire to investigate and prosecute the matter.40 Therefore, 
even if the ICC has jurisdiction over a case, the ICC may not be 
able to hear the case if forced to defer to a State’s judicial 
system.41 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute outlines when a case is 
“inadmissible” before the ICC.42 Even if the ICC has 
jurisdiction, it is prohibited from considering a case when: (1) a 
State with jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the case; 
(2) the case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction and the State has decided not to prosecute, unless 
the State made that decision based on an unwillingness or 
inability genuinely to prosecute; (3) the person involved in the 
case has already been tried for the conduct specified in 
complaint; or (4) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify 
 
 36. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 18(1), at 12.   
 37. Id. art. 18(2), at 12.  
 38. Id.; See Pre-Trial Division, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc 
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Chambers/Pre+Trial+Division/ 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2001) (detailing the Pre-Trial Chambers role as the 
judicial body handling cases until the confirmation of charges, when a Trial 
Chamber is convened). 
 39. Chibueze, supra note 26, at 192 (quoting Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, 
Article 18: Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON 
THE ROME STATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ 
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 627, 632 (Otto Triffterer 2d ed. 2008). 
 40. Id. at 192–93; See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 18(2)–(3), at 12–13 
(outlining the procedures for jurisdiction, including the fact that the 
Prosecutor must, upon notification from a State of its intent to investigate, 
defer review for six months or at any point when a significant change of 
circumstances toward the State’s willingness to ability to genuinely carry out 
the proceedings has occurred). 
 41. See Pichon, supra note 33, at 188 (explaining that admissibility is 
distinguishable from jurisdiction and that a case can be inadmissible before 
the ICC even though it has jurisdiction). 
 42. Rome Statute, supra note 8, at 12. 
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further action by the ICC.43 Notably, Article 17 assumes 
admissibility before the ICC except when one of these four 
situations occur.44 If none of these conditions are met, a case is 
de facto admissible.45 If the Rome Statue had been drafted with 
a presumption of inadmissibility, its objective of ending 
impunity46 would be undermined as an accused could escape 
punishment through State inactively alone.47 Therefore, a State 
is required to make a good faith attempt to investigate or 
prosecute the case before it can divest the case of admissibility 
before the ICC.48 
 
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE INADMISSIBILITY OF A CASE UNDER 
ARTICLE 17 OF THE ROME STATUTE 
Even if a case is being investigated or prosecuted by a 
State with jurisdiction, thus meeting one of the criteria for the 
case to be deemed inadmissible before the ICC, Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute provides a narrow exception that allows the ICC 
to retain admissibility. The ICC is not required to find 
inadmissibility if “the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”49 Thus, the fact that 
a State is investigating or prosecuting a case is not enough to 
determine inadmissibility on its own. Inadmissibility in these 
circumstances depends on a subsequent finding that the State 
is both willing and able to genuinely conduct the proceedings.50 
The Rome Statute specifies guidelines for determining when a 
State is “unwilling” or “unable” to conduct the investigation or 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 104–05; see MOHAMED M. EL ZEIDY, THE 
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ORIGIN, 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE 159 (2008) (noting that Article 17 is drafted in a 
negative form). 
 45. EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 159. 
 46. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at 2 (“Affirming that the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.”). 
 47. KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 105 (noting that an assumption of 
inadmissibility would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Statute to 
bring effective prosecution and end impunity for the most serious of 
international crimes). 
 48. Id. (“[C]omplete inaction on the national level would thus allow the 
ICC to take up a case without having to enter into an assessment of the 
admissibility criteria . . . .”). 
 49. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(1)(a), at 12 (emphasis added).   
 50. See EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 161–62 (noting the ICC’s support of 
this proposition in their 2006 decision in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case). 
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prosecution, thus giving rise to admissibility before the ICC.51 
In practice, this exception allows the ICC to intervene when 
national judicial proceedings are merely a pretense to shield 
the accused from criminal responsibility.52   
 
1. Criterion of “Unwillingness” 
Concerned about sacrificing State sovereignty and 
reluctant to provide the ICC with the power to assess a State’s 
judicial capacity, the Rome Statute drafters found it difficult to 
decide on a workable definition of “unwillingness.”53 To combat 
these concerns, the drafters sought to reduce the subjective 
nature of the definition while recognizing that the ICC needed 
to maintain some discretion in the determination.54 As a 
compromise, the drafters added the element of “genuineness” to 
the Article 17 determination of admissibility.55 None of the 
Rome Statute itself, the Rules or Regulations of the Court, or 
the ICC’s jurisprudence has defined “genuine,” but most 
scholars have interpreted the term as to invoke a requirement 
of good faith put forth on behalf of the State in their 
investigation and prosecution of a case.56 This requirement 
applies both to the determination of “unwillingness” and 
“inability.”57 
Unlike its vague use of the term “genuinely,” the Rome 
Statute clearly outlines the circumstances which ICC should 
consider applicable for a determination of “unwillingness.”58 
 
 51. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17, at 12. 
 52. Gurule, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 53. EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 163; see also, NIDAL NABIL JURDI, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS 13 (Mark Findlay & 
Ralph Henham eds., 2011) (“Many states did not want the ICC to function as a 
court of appeal.”). 
 54. See EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 163 (noting that the use of criteria 
such as “apparently well founded” or “ineffective” trial procedures were 
rejected as being too subjective).   
 55. Id. at 163–64 (“[T]he drafters compromised by adding the word 
‘genuinely’ as the least disagreeable and most objective term.”); see Rome 
Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(1)(a), at 12 (explaining that a case is 
inadmissible if being investigated by the State “unless the State is unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”) (emphasis 
added).  
 56. See Chibueze, supra note 26, at 194 (noting that “genuinely. . . 
appears to invoke a requirement of good faith on behalf of the State”); EL 
ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 164–65 (“[T]he most resemblance to genuineness is 
perhaps the concept of good faith.”). 
 57. See JURDI, supra note 53, at 13. 
 58. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(2), at 12 (outlining conditions 
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The first criterion of the determination retains a subjective 
element, requiring the ICC to evaluate the State’s intention in 
the proceedings.59 The second two elements retain a notion of 
objectivity in their determination.60 Some scholars have noted 
that the three scenarios listed in Article 17(2) which present a 
clear indication of “unwillingness” are not exhaustive, but 
merely illustrative of the conditions that would lead to a 
determination of “unwillingness.”61   
When considering a State’s unwillingness to investigate or 
prosecute a crime, the ICC is to consider the situation with 
“regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law.”62 This language raises the question of 
whether a violation of due process alone can be determinative 
of a State’s “unwillingness” or “inability” to conduct the 
investigation or prosecution.63 “The ensuing question is 
whether a State which is investigating the case, but in breach 
of certain due process guarantees, can be declared unwilling (or 
unable) to investigate, even if this seems to be a contradiction 
 
where a State will be determined to be unwilling: “a) The proceedings were or 
are being undertaken or the nation decision was made for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; b) There has been an 
unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; c) The proceedings 
were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they 
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”); see Wilt 
& Lyngdorf, supra note 34, at 40 (“Unjustified delays, sham trials which serve 
to shield the perpetrator from criminal responsibility, or proceedings lacking 
independence or impartiality are indicative of unwillingness . . . .”). 
 59. EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 168; see also, Louise Arbour & Morten 
Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach, in REFLECTIONS 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 129, 131 (Herman A.M. von Hebel 
et al. eds., 1999) (commenting that “the Prosecutor must prove a devious 
intent on the part of the State, contrary to its apparent actions”). 
 60. EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 168. 
 61. See Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth 
Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 
500 (2003) (discussing that the phrase “the Court shall consider . . . whether 
one or more of the following exist” leads to the conclusion that the list is not 
exhaustive). But see, EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 168 (“‘Unwillingness’ is the 
exception to this rule and, thus, the provision should be given a narrow 
interpretation – treating the list under paragraph (2) as exhaustive.”).  
 62. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(2), at 12. 
 63. See Pichon, supra note 33, at 191 (noting that the language of Article 
17(2) in combination with Article 17(2)(c) may indicate that a lack of due 
process can lead to the admissibility of a case before the ICC). 
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in terms.”64 Most international criminal law scholars believe 
that if the ICC determines that a State will not provide a 
defendant with due process, the case is admissible. These 
scholars argue that under those circumstances, the State is 
“unable” to investigate or prosecute (“Due Process Theory”).65 
However, it remains to be seen whether the Prosecutor will 
secure admissibility of a case simply on the basis of a lack of 
national due process.66  
 
2. Criterion of “Inability” 
The second ground for the ICC to rebut a State’s contention 
of inadmissibility is when a State is “unable” to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.67 Article 17(3) defines “inability” 
as a situation in which “due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and 
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”68 
Agreement on the definition of “inability” was achieved more 
easily than the definition of “unwillingness” because of the 
 
 64. Id. at 191. 
 65. See Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its 
Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 215, 241 (2002) (“If states desire to retain control over prosecuting 
nationals charged with crimes under the ICC Statute, they must ensure that 
their own judicial systems meet international standards. At a minimum, 
states will have to adhere to standards of due process found in international 
human rights instruments, particularly as they relate to the rights of 
defendants.”); see also, Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of 
Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due 
Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255, 257–59 (2006) (“[I]s a case admissible under article 
17 if the Court determines that the State asserting jurisdiction over it will not 
provide the defendant with due process? The overwhelming consensus among 
international criminal law scholars is that the answer is ‘yes’. Indeed, I have 
not found a single scholar writing in English who does not accept the due 
process thesis.”); see also Frank Meyer, Complementing Complementarity, 6 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 549, 567 (2006) (“[I]mpunity could also result de facto from 
conduct under the color of law. Thus, minimal standards [of national practices] 
have to be satisfied.”); see also Pichon, supra note 33, at 192 (“A multitude of 
international criminal law scholars uncritically agree that the principle of 
complementarity is applicable to all questions of a due process.”). 
 66. See Kevin Jon Heller, Libya Challenges the Admissibility of the Cases 
Against Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, OPINIO JURIS (May 2, 2012), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/02/libya-challenges-the-admissibility-of-the-
cases-against-gaddafi-and-al-senussi/ (arguing that the Rome Statute was 
specifically drafted to prevent admittance of a case based solely on a lack of 
national due process). 
 67. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(1)(a), at 12. 
 68. Id. art. 17(3), at 12. 
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more objective nature of the determination.69 “Inability” of a 
State can arise in two separate ways: through either a 
substantial collapse70 or the unavailability of the judicial 
system.71 In order for the ICC to rule a case admissible, the 
inability must manifest itself in one of the following situations: 
1) the State is unable to secure the custody of the perpetrator; 
2) the State is unable to gather the evidence and testimony 
needed; or 3) the State is otherwise unable to carry out the 
proceedings.72 The third scenario was added “to serve as a 
catch-all clause for all sorts of situations that might arise in the 
course of the domestic process.”73 
Inevitably, the determination of whether a State is 
“unwilling” or “unable” to carry out an investigation or 
prosecution involves a review of the States’ national judicial 
system, one which has the potential to be viewed as an 
unwelcome threat to national sovereignty.74 Determinations of 
admissibility are made by the ICC based on its own 
independent assessment.75 It is unclear whether the ICC 
should be permitted to intervene and disregard 
complementarity only when sham proceedings occur or whether 
the ICC should intervene to “correct a perceived miscarriage of 
justice for any reason,” thus substituting its judgment for that 
of the national courts.76 Because of this review function, 
developing countries will be much more likely to have their 
judicial systems judged as unable or unwilling to conduct 
prosecutions, while developed nations will be able to benefit 
from the complementarity principle and avoid the jurisdiction 
 
 69. See KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 152–53 (noting that the agreement 
on “inability” was achieved more easily than that of “unwillingness”). 
 70. Id. at 153 (commenting that notions of a “partial collapse” in earlier 
drafts were replaced by a requirement of “total and complete” collapse in the 
final version of the Rome Statute). 
 71. See id. at 153; EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 222 (“This might be caused 
by public disorder, national disasters and chaos resulting from a civil war or 
the unavailability of an effective judicial system . . . .”). 
 72. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(3), at 12. 
 73. EL ZEIDY, supra note 44, at 224. 
 74. Chibueze, supra note 26, at 194. 
 75. Declarations by a State that it considers itself to be unable to 
investigate or prosecute a crime will not be binding on the Court. See 
KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 102 (explaining the process for determining 
whether the criteria for admissibility of a case have been met). 
 76. Gurule, supra note 9, at 8–9 (noting that one possible solution would 
be to require a “clearly erroneous” standard of review or a “no reasonable 
basis” test before the ICC upsets its deference to State prosecution). 
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of the ICC.77 As such, the ICC has the potential of becoming a 
default criminal jurisdiction for developing countries that are 
unable to prove the worth of their legal systems.78 These States 
will inevitably view the ICC as a pawn of western countries 
who are free from accountability before it, tainting the 
legitimacy of the ICC as an independent international judicial 
institution.79 
If the ICC has any doubts regarding the admissibility of a 
case, it may, “on its own motion, determine the admissibility of 
a case” under Article 19.80 Furthermore, challenges to the 
admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the ICC may be 
brought by: “(a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of 
arrest or a summons to appear has been issued under article 
58; (b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground 
that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has 
investigated or prosecuted; or (c) A State from which 
acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12.”81 This 
challenge must occur prior to the commencement of trial and 
may occur “only once by any person or State.”82 Until the recent 
challenge by Libya, an admissibility challenge of this nature 
had never been brought before the ICC.83 
 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INITIATES 
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MUAMMAR GADDAFI, SAIF AL-ISLAM 
GADDAFI, AND ABDULLAH AL-SENUSSI 
Following the U.N. Security Council’s unanimous referral 
 
 77. See Chibueze, supra note 26, at 196 (noting that developed countries 
will be able to use the complementarity principle as a trump card to evade 
prosecution by the ICC, a benefit which will elude developing countries).  
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 19(1), at 13 (“The Court shall 
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court 
may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance 
with article 17.”). 
 81. Id. art. 19(2), at 13–14. 
 82. See id. art. 19(4), at 14. 
 83. See Press Release, Security Council, International Criminal Court 
Chief Tells Security Council Libya Wants Domestic Courts to Handle 
Proceedings Against Son of Former Libyan Leader Qadhafi, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10651 (May 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10651.doc.htm (recognition by ICC 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo that Libya’s admissibility challenge was “the 
first time in the Court’s history that such a challenge had occurred”). 
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of the situation in Libya to the ICC on February 26, 2011,84 the 
Prosecutor opened a formal investigation on potential crimes 
committed during the uprising. Although recognizing that 
Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute and thus not bound by 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, the Security Council urged Libya to 
“cooperate fully with . . . the Court and the Prosecutor.”85 On 
May 16, 2011, after only two months of the investigation,86 the 
Prosecutor sought arrest warrants from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber87 for alleged crimes committed by Muammar Gaddafi, 
Sail al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-Senussi.88 Moving 
remarkably quickly, the Pre-Trial Chamber accepted the 
Prosecutor’s application on June 27, 2011.89 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber determined that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that the three men were criminally responsible for one 
count of murder as a crime against humanity under Article 
7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute and one count of persecution as a 
crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(h).90 As such, the 
 
 84. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (“The 
Security Council . . . [d]ecides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court.”). 
 85. See id. ¶ 5, at 2. 
 86. See, e.g., Mark Kersten, Whither ICC Deterrence in Libya?, JUST. IN 
CONFLICT (Mar. 6, 2012) http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/03/06/whither-icc-
deterrence-in-libya/ (discussing that two month is a very short period of time 
for investigation before an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber for arrest 
warrants and speculating that the ICC moved quickly hoping to prove its 
effectiveness at deterrence if the conflict was terminated) [hereinafter 
Kersten, Whither ICC Deterrence]; see also, Kersten, supra note 3 (“With 
unprecedented speed, the Court opened an investigation in early March and, 
in June 2011, issued arrest warrants . . . .”). 
 87. See Pre-Trial Division, supra note 38 (describing that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC is in charge of authorizing the investigation, determining 
whether a reasonable basis for jurisdiction exists, issuing warrants of arrest, 
and conducting other preliminary matters before charges are confirmed and 
the case moves to the Trial Chamber of the ICC).   
 88. Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11-4-Red, 
Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed 
Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (May 16, 
2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1073503.pdf.  
 89. Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-1, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to 
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf.  
 90. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 7(1)(h), at 5 (“Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
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Pre-Trial Chamber issued warrants for the arrest of the three 
men.91 Based upon the scope of the Security Council referral, 
the ICC warrants only cover conduct beginning on February 15, 
2011.92 
On July 4, 2011, the ICC filed its request93 for Libya to 
arrest and surrender the accused men in accordance with the 
directive of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970.94 Muammar 
Gaddafi was killed by Libyan forces on October 20, 2011,95 
causing the ICC to terminate proceedings against him shortly 
thereafter.96 On November 19, 2011, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi 
(“Saif”) was captured in an attempt to flee to Niger, arrested, 
and taken to Zintan where he remains in militia custody.97 Just 
 
connection with any action referred to in this paragraph or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
 91. See Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11-
01/11-2, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi 
(June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101339.pdf; see also, 
Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-3, 
Warrant of Arrest for Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101345.pdf; see also, Situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11-4, Warrant of Arrest for Abdullah Al-
Senussi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101360.pdf. 
 92. Libya: Q&A on the ICC and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/libya-qa-icc-and-saif-al-
islam-gaddafi. 
 93. Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Request to 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the Arrest and Surrender of Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi, 4–5 (July 4, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1102510.pdf. 
 94. S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 84, ¶ 5 (“[W]hile recognizing that States not 
party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, [the Security 
Council] urges all States . . . to cooperate fully with the Court and the 
Prosecutor . . . .”). 
 95. See Kareem Fahim, Anthony Shadid & Rick Gladstone, Violent End to 
an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyan-
forces-take-surt.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the circumstances 
surrounding the death of Muammar Gaddafi and the possibility that anti-
regime forces executed him). 
 96. Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision 
to Terminate the Case Against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 
4–5 (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1274559.pdf 
(terminating the proceedings against Muammar Gaddafi based on the changed 
circumstances due to his death). 
 97. See Jomana Karadsheh, Libyans Celebrate Capture of Gadhafi’s Son 
Saif al-Islam, CNN, Nov. 19, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-
19/africa/world_africa_libya-gadhafi-son_1_saif-al-islam-prime-minister-
abdurrahim-el-keib-moammar-gadhafi?_s=PM:AFRICA (discussing capture of 
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four days later, the Libyan Government initiated an 
investigation into Saif’s alleged crimes of corruption and other 
financial crimes, but not the same crimes of murder and 
persecution the ICC warrant covered.98 Not until January 8, 
2012 did the Libyan Prosecutor begin investigating the crimes 
of murder and rape allegedly committed by Saif during the 
2011 Libyan revolution.99 
While the Libyan Government conducted an internal 
investigation as to Saif’s crimes, the ICC continued to conduct 
its own investigation simultaneously. On December 6, 2011, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the Office of Public Counsel for 
the Defense (“OPCD”) to represent Saif and on February 3, 
2012, issued a decision ordering the Registry, the 
administrative arm of the ICC, to arrange for an OPCD visit to 
Libya to meet with Saif.100 The OPCD visited Libya from 
February 29 to March 4, 2012, where it met with Saif at the 
detention facility in Zintan where he has remained in custody 
since his arrest.101 Following its visit, the OPCD filed two 
confidential reports with the Pre-Trial Chamber documenting 
the results of its meeting. The first, written on March 2, 2012, 
notes that “[t]he objective of the visit was completely 
frustrated. Based on the information that the OPCD received 
during this visit, the OPCD has grave concerns regarding 
whether it will be possible to uphold the rights of Mr. [Saif] 
Gaddafi before the ICC in an effective manner, whilst he is 
 
Saif and the implications on the ICC arrest warrant); see also Kersten, supra 
note 3 (noting that as of October 8, 2012, Saif remains in custody in Zintan). 
 98. See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, 
Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya 
Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, ¶ 23 (May 1, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1405819.pdf (“On the same date [November 23, 2011] the 
Libyan Government commenced an investigation into criminal conduct (and in 
particular, allegations of corruption and other financial crimes) by Mr. 
Gaddafi.”) [hereinafter Admissibility Challenge]. Notably, on December 17, 
2011, the investigation was expanded to include allegations surrounding Saif’s 
“crimes against the person.” Id. 
 99. Id. ¶ 25. 
 100. See id. ¶¶ 24, 27; Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah 
Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Registry-OPCD Visit to 
Libya (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1326911.pdf 
(“Considering . . . that a personal visit from the Registry and the OPCD is the 
best mechanism to ensure that Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi is well informed about 
the current stage of the proceedings before the Court and of the appointment 
of the OPCD to represent his interests . . . .”). 
 101. Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶ 27. 
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being detained in Libya by the current authorities.”102 The 
second, filed on March 5, 2012, after visiting with Saif, details 
the conditions of Saif’s detention, notes Saif’s desire to be 
detained under the custody of the ICC in The Hague, and his 
futile requests for a lawyer in connection with the Libyan 
proceedings.103 This report further details that Libyan 
authorities informed Saif that they had terminated their 
investigation as to the allegations of rape and murder for a lack 
of evidence and that Saif had only been interviewed by Libyan 
authorities in connection with allegations of minor offenses 
related to improper camel licensing and the cleanliness of his 
fish farms.104 Libya vigorously denies these allegations.105 
On March 17, 2012, Abdullah al-Senussi (“al-Senussi”) was 
arrested in Mauritania, leading many to hope that he would be 
transferred to the ICC.106 In addition to the outstanding ICC 
 
 102. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case 
No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Public Redacted Version Urgent Report Concerning the 
Visit to Libya, ¶ 2 (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1391722.pdf. The OPCD was informed that it was not 
possible for it to have privileged communications with Saif regarding its 
representation of him while he was detained, detailed how Saif had not been 
provided with any arrest warrant or documents concerning the proceedings 
before the ICC, and explained that the OPCD visit with Saif had been 
cancelled by Libyan authorities at the last moment with no legitimate 
explanation. Id. ¶¶ 22, 26, 29–37. 
 103. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case 
No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Second Public Redacted Version Urgent Report 
Concerning the Visit to Libya (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1388863.pdf. 
 104. Id. ¶ 38–39. 
 105. See Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶ 28 (“[T]hese allegations 
were made without any attempt to check their accuracy . . . .”); id. ¶ 38 (“It is 
particularly unfortunate that [Libya] brings its Article 19 application in the 
context of unverified and unwarranted allegations of bad faith made by the 
OPCD . . . . The Libyan Government trusts that the Pre-Trial Chamber will 
not allow such baseless allegations to prejudice Libya’s Article 19 
application.”); id. ¶ 94 (“The inappropriate and unsubstantiated allegations by 
the OPCD against Libya in this regard have been prejudicial and 
contradictory. . . . These allegations are irresponsible and patently false. No 
evidence has been tendered to support them.”); see also id. ¶ 35 (alleging that 
Saif has been kept in adequate conditions of detention, provided with good 
quality food, given access to ICC lawyers, not subject to physical abuse, 
provided with medical and dental care, and is being “investigated under 
Libyan law with respect to crimes arising out of the same serious conduct as 
that set forth in the arrest warrant issued by the [ICC].”). But see Heller, 
supra note 66 (discussing how the OPCD as an official organ of the court has 
no reason to lie about Saif’s confinement conditions whereas the Libyan 
government has countless reasons to do so). 
 106. Gaddafi Spy Chief Abdullah al-Senussi Held in Mauritania, BBC 
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warrant seeking custody of the single man said to know the 
darkest secrets of Gaddafi’s regime,107 French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy also requested extradition from Mauritania for 
al-Senussi based on his conviction and pending life sentence in 
France.108 In addition, Libya demanded that Mauritania hand 
al-Senussi over to face trial for his alleged crimes in connection 
with the 2011 uprising.109 Following his arrest, on April 3, 
2012, Libyan officials began to investigate al-Senussi for both 
financial crimes and crimes against the person under Libyan 
law.110 Despite the competing requests for extradition, 
Mauritania surrendered al-Senussi to Libya on September 5, 
2012.111 Based on the ongoing competing ICC investigation into 
al-Senussi and Saif’s crimes, on May 1, 2012, the Libyan 
Government formally filed an admissibility challenge of the 
ICC’s case, Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah 
Al-Senussi.112 
 
II. ANALYSIS OF ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CASE OF SAIF 
AND AL-SENUSSI BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
The Admissibility Challenge raised by Libya comes at a 
time when both the Libyan government and the ICC are trying 
 
NEWS, Mar. 17, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17413626; 
Vivienne Walt, Why Libya—and Not The Hague—Will Try Gaddafi’s Son, 
TIME, Oct. 10, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/10/10/why-libya-and-not-the-
hague-will-try-gaddafis-son/. 
 107. Ian Black, Abdullah al-Senussi: Spy Chief Who Knew Muammar 
Gaddafi’s Secrets, GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/05/abdullah-al-senussi-libya-
secrets. 
 108. Al-Senussi had been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in 
France for his involvement in a 1989 attack that killed 170 people on a French 
plane. If al-Senussi had been extradited to France, it is likely that France 
would have been obligated to surrender him to the ICC. See BBC NEWS, supra 
note 106 (“Already sentenced to life in prison in France; President Sarkozy 
says French authorities involved in arrest; but France may be obliged to hand 
[Al-Senussi] to ICC.”).  
 109. Id. 
 110. Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, at ¶ 23. 
 111. See Mauritania Deports Libya Spy Chief Abdullah al-Senussi, BBC 
NEWS, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19487228 (noting 
that Al-Senussi was extradited to Libya based on Libyan assurances that he 
would receive a fair trial). Mauritania is not a signatory to the Rome Statute 
and was not obligated to surrender Al-Senussi to the ICC although many 
hoped it would, ensuring that he would receive a fair trial. BBC NEWS, supra 
note 106. 
 112. Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98. 
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to establish their identity in the international arena. While the 
ICC desires to legitimize itself as an effective international 
judicial institution, the new Libyan government seeks to 
demonstrate its sovereignty and ability to prosecute those 
behind the mass human rights abuses which characterized the 
Gaddafi regime.113 Part II seeks to examine the Admissibility 
Challenge in light of these competing goals. First, Part II.A 
begins by evaluating the arguments made by Libya in the 
Admissibility Challenge and explains why a lack of national 
due process on its own is not grounds for admissibility of a case 
before the ICC. Part II.B then explains how Libya’s failure to 
provide Saif with due process rights remains relevant to the 
discussion of admissibility. Part II.C concludes by addressing 
how the ICC should respond to the Admissibility Challenge and 
what changes need to be made for the ICC to remain a relevant 
and effective international judicial body. At the onset, it should 
be noted that Libya’s Challenge is primarily directed only at 
the admissibility of the case concerning Saif, not al-Senuissi.114 
 
A. THE ABSENCE OF NATIONAL DUE PROCESS IS NOT A 
GROUNDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY 
Libya raises its Admissibility Challenge under Article 
19(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, challenging the jurisdiction of the 
ICC to hear the case on the grounds that it is actively 
investigating the crimes of Saif and al-Senussi domestically.115 
If Libya is truly actively investigating, then according to Article 
17(1)(a) the case should be inadmissible unless Libya is 
“unwilling” or “unable” to genuinely carry out the 
investigation.116 The Challenge is devoted towards persuading 
 
 113. See Kersten, Whither ICC Deterrence, supra note 86 (contemplating 
that the dispute over where to try Saif and al-Senussi could frustrate and 
undermine both of these goals). 
 114. Libya argues that the case against each individual must be treated as 
a separate inquiry and the proper scope of the current Admissibility Challenge 
relates only to the charges against Saif. If the Pre-Trial Chamber determines 
otherwise, Libya notes that it is actively investigating the case of Al-Senussi 
as well and the same arguments apply as are being made in regards to Saif.  
Because of this position, the Admissibility Challenge is written as an 
evaluation of the investigation of the charges against Saif alone. See 
Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶¶ 69–75. 
 115. See id. ¶ 1; see also Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 19(2), at 13 
(“Challenges to the admissibility of a case . . . may be made by: . . . A state 
which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted . . . .”). 
 116. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(1)(a), at 12. 
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the Pre-Trial Chamber that the Libyan authorities are willing 
and able to conduct Saif’s investigation domestically and that 
to deny them of this opportunity would be “inconsistent with 
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.”117   
 
1. Libya’s Admissibility Challenge Argues that Libya is 
Able to Guarantee Due Process Rights to Saif 
In order to demonstrate its ability and willingness to 
investigate Saif and its commitment to provide him with 
internationally recognized due process rights along the way, 
Libya details in the Admissibility Challenge the Libyan Code of 
Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Procedure Code”) and the 
recently enacted Libyan Constitutional Declaration which 
together outline the due process rights guaranteed to Libyan 
citizens.118 The Libyan Constitutional Declaration provides 
certain judicial guarantees to citizens, including an 
independent and impartial judiciary, which Libya had not 
experienced in over four decades of Gaddafi rule.119 Not only is 
this guarantee constitutionally mandated but it is also 
protected under provisions of domestic Libyan law.120 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Declaration guarantees the 
following due process rights to Libyan citizens: 
i. There shall be no crime or penalty except by 
virtue of the text of the law; 
ii. Any defendant shall be innocent until he is 
proven guilty by a fair trial wherein he shall be 
granted the guarantees necessary to defend 
himself; 
iii. Each and every citizen shall have the right to 
recourse to the judicial authority in accordance 
with the law; 
iv. Right of resorting to judiciary shall be 
preserved and guaranteed for all people; 
v. Each and every citizen shall have the right to 
resort to his natural judge; 
vi. The State shall guarantee to bring the 
 
 117. Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶ 2. 
 118. See id. ¶¶ 39–67. 
 119. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, Mar. 8, 2011, Part 4, art. 31–32 
(Libya). 
 120. See Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶ 55 (noting that an 
independent judiciary is guaranteed in Article 52 of the Judicial System Law 
and Article 31 in the Freedoms Act). 
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judiciary authorities near the litigants and shall 
guarantee the swift determination on lawsuits; 
vii. Laws shall not provide for the prohibition of 
judiciary authority to control any administrative 
decree.121  
Likewise, the Criminal Procedure Code specifies that the 
accused has the right to a lawyer,122 the right to view 
investigative materials relating to the case,123 and numerous 
trial proceeding rights.124  
Despite Libya’s assurances that Saif has these due process 
guarantees under Libyan law and that their investigation 
complies with these rights, the general consensus remains that 
Saif will not have a fair trial if it is conducted in Libya.125 
Several respected independent agencies have documented 
widespread and serious human rights abuses by militia leaders 
across Libya since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, leading 
Amnesty International to declare that “[l]awlessness still 
pervades Libya a year after the outbreak of the uprising.”126 
When Amnesty International delegates visited eleven detention 
centers across Libya in January and February 2012, they found 
torture and ill-treatment of suspected Gaddafi loyalist 
detainees in ten of those locations.127 Despite being alerted of 
 
 121. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, Mar. 8, 2011, Part 4, art. 31–32 
(Libya). 
 122. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case 
No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Libyan Government’s Filing of Compilation of Libyan 
Law Referred to in its Admissibility Challenge, Annex B, art. 106 (May 28, 
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1418852.pdf (“[I]nvestigator may 
not interrogate any accused or confront him with other accused persons or 
witnesses except after summoning his lawyer to appear . . . .”) [hereinafter 
Compilation of Libyan Law]; id. art. 161 (“Indictment shall automatically 
appoint an advocate for any accused of a felony . . . if he did not elect an 
advocate to defend him.”). 
 123. See Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶ 2. 
 124. See Compilation of Libyan Law, supra note 122, arts. 241, 247, 251, 
266, 276. 
 125. See Leanos, supra note 4, at 2295 (Noting that after four decades of 
repression and disregard for the independency of the legal system, “observers 
worry that Libya lacks a viable judicial system”). 
 126. Amnesty International, Militias Threaten Hopes for New Libya, 5 AI 
Index: MDE 19/002/2012 (Feb. 2012). 
 127. See id. at 6 (“Detainees are often tortured immediately after being 
seized by militias and subsequently during interrogation, including in 
officially recognized detention centres. To date, detainees have not been 
allowed access to lawyers, except for rare cases in eastern Libya. . . . Some 
detainees were too scared to speak – fearing further torture if they did so – 
and were only prepared to show Amnesty International delegates their torture 
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the ongoing militia abuses,128 the Libyan transitional 
government has been unwilling to recognize the problem and 
has failed to take any action to hold the militia responsible.129 
The Amnesty International Report summarizes that:  
Despite pledges to bring to justice those who 
committed war crimes and human rights abuses 
on both sides, the authorities have so far failed 
to take action against suspects who fought with 
the NTC forces, sustaining a climate of impunity 
for human rights abuses . . . . Thousands of 
detainees remain held in scores of detention 
facilities in Libya where torture is rife . . . . 
Indeed, the failure of the authorities to even 
begin to investigate with a view to bringing to 
justice former anti-Gaddafi fighters responsible 
for war crimes during the conflict and human 
rights abuses has perpetuated the climate of 
impunity for such crimes.130 
Likewise, the United Nation’s International Commission of 
Inquiry on Libya issued a similar report declaring that 
“[b]reaches of international human rights law continue to occur 
in a climate of impunity.”131 
These allegations, coupled with the unfavorable OPCD 
reports regarding their visit with Saif in March 2012, make a 
strong case for concluding that Libya is not able to provide Saif 
with due process guarantees. Melinda Taylor, the OPCD 
defense counsel appointed for Saif, notes that Saif has been 
denied access to meet with lawyers and argues that Libya has 
 
wounds.”); see also Leanos, supra note 4, at 2296 (“[T]here are numerous 
reports that detainees from the revolution currently held in Libyan prisons are 
being tortured and subjected to human rights abuses. Also, according to 
Amnesty International, many of the over 8,000 detainees were arrested 
without a warrant and without any legitimate reason whatsoever, other than 
being thought to have supported Gaddafi.”). 
 128. In May 2011, the National Transitional Government (“NTC”) was told 
of the patterns of abuse, torture, and killings by opposition fighters through an 
Amnesty International memorandum. In September and October 2011, 
Amnesty International published two additional reports detailing the militia 
abuse. On January 26, 2012, Medecins Sans Frontieres, an independent, 
international medical humanitarian organization, suspended its work in 
Misratah because of ongoing torture there. That day, Amnesty International 
also released further reports on recent incidents of torture and death across 
Libyan detention facilities. Amnesty International, supra note 126, at 6. 
 129. Id. at 7. 
 130. Id. at 6–7, 10. 
 131. Kersten, Whither ICC Deterrence, supra note 86. 
BISHOP Note 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:03 AM 
410 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 22 
 
provided no information regarding their plan to conduct a fair 
and safe trial for him in the midst of ongoing instability in 
Libya.132 Most in the international community question Libya’s 
ability to give Saif a fair trial, especially in light of reports 
concerning his current treatment.133 Despite the new statutory 
and constitutional guarantees in Libyan law, Libya’s 
guarantees mean nothing unless they are actually observed. 
The international community has witnessed similar 
conundrums. Iraq’s failed guarantee that it could provide a fair 
trial for Saddam Hussein because of the formal legal 
procedures governing the Iraqi High tribunal still resonates 
with the international community; many fear a repeat situation 
in Libya.134 Unfortunately, as many in the international 
criminal law community realize, “the statutory and 
constitutional right to a fair trial does not guarantee that a 
defendant will actually receive a fair trial.”135 
 
2. Flaws in the Due Process Theory as Grounds For 
Admissibility 
Despite the negative implications, a lack of national due 
process on its own is not grounds for admissibility of a case 
before the ICC. Defending a State’s right to hold unfair trials is 
not a popular view and most scholars choose not to take this 
position. Nonetheless, an examination of the drafting history of 
the Rome Statute and the plain language of the statute reveals 
that however unpopular, this view is correct. 
 
 132. See Walt, supra note 106 (quoting Ms. Taylor as saying that “we have 
not had any ability to contact Mr. Gaddafi and none of his friends and family 
have been able to contact him”). 
 133. See Heller, supra note 66 (“I don’t know many people who work in 
[international criminal law] who actually believe that Libya intends to give 
Saif and Al-Senussi trials that comport with international standards of due 
process, regardless of its protestations to the contrary.”); Amnesty 
International, Libya Must Seek Justice Not Revenge in the Case of Former Al-
Gaddafi Intelligence Chief, (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=20390 (“Trying al-
Senussi in Libya where the justice system remains weak and fair trials are 
still out of reach, undermines the right of victims to seek justice and 
reparation. Instead, he should face the ICC’s charges of crimes against 
humanity in fair proceedings.”). 
 134. See Heller, supra note 66 (“[It] wasn’t so long ago that Iraq 
guaranteed it would give Saddam Hussein a fair trial and defended that 
guarantee by pointing to the (ostensible) formal adequacy of the law and 
procedure governing the Iraqi High Tribunal. And we all know that that trial 
turned out.”). 
 135. Id. 
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In order for a case to be admissible before the ICC despite 
an ongoing investigation or prosecution by a State, it must be 
shown that the State “is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the proceedings.”136 Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute 
states: “In order to determine unwillingness in a particular 
case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of 
due process recognized by international law, whether one or 
more of the following exist . . . .”137 Although these “principles 
of due process” have not been clearly defined, this phrase has 
been interpreted as setting some minimum standards of 
conduct that a State must satisfy in order to show that it is 
“willing” to investigate or prosecute a particular case.138 
Reading a due process requirement to the complementarity 
doctrine creates a safety net for situations when a deferral to 
State jurisdiction would expose the accused to national judicial 
systems that are unable to guarantee due process.139 
Unfortunately, this fallback does not exist in the true 
complementary regime designed by the Rome Statute. Article 
17 still requires the ICC to defer to the jurisdiction of a State in 
situations where unfair trial proceedings (a lack of due process 
guarantees) are used to make the accused easier to convict.140 
Due Process Theory advocates point to the “independent” 
and “impartial” language in Article 17(c) to support the claim 
that Article 17 creates a due process requirement.141 These 
advocates argue that proceedings in which an individual is 
easier to convict because of violations of his due process 
guarantees are proceedings not conducted independently or 
impartially.142 A reading of Article 17(2)(c) in its entirety 
however, refutes this premise. Article 17(2)(c) states that in 
order to determine unwillingness the ICC shall consider 
whether: “The proceedings were not or are not being conducted 
independent or impartially, and they were or are being 
 
 136. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(1)(a), at 12. 
 137. Id. 17(2), at 12 (emphasis added). 
 138. See KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 127 (“The Statue does not identify 
[these principles] and the drafting history of Article 17(2) does not elucidate 
what the drafters of the Statute had in mind when including the notion of 
‘principles of due process’ in the provision.”); Meyer, supra note 65, at 567. 
 139. Heller, supra note 65, at 256. 
 140. Id. at 257. 
 141. Id. at 260. 
 142. Id. (“[W]e would not describe a proceeding that violates due process in 
order to make the defendant easier to convict as either ‘independent’ or 
‘impartial.’”). 
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conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.”143 The use of the coupling term “and” indicates that 
both requirements must be met in order for the ICC to 
determine a state to be “unwilling” and a case therefore 
admissible.144   
As a result, in order for due process violations to be a basis 
for declaring a state to be “unwilling,” those due process 
violations must also be inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
accused to justice.145 Therefore, due process is only applicable 
to admissibility when it is designed to make the accused more 
difficult to convict.146 However, in most cases, due process 
violations are used to make a defendant easier to convict. In 
those cases, Article 17(2)(c) would not apply. Article 17(2)(c) 
simply cannot apply when due process violations make it easier 
to secure a conviction because “such a proceeding, though 
unfair, is simply not inconsistent with the intent to bring the 
defendant to justice.”147   
For this same reason, basing the Due Process Theory on 
the “principles of due process recognized by international law” 
language of Article 17(2) is flawed.148 A violation of the 
principles of due process recognized by international law on its 
own is not a basis for determining unwillingness.149 Instead, 
one of the three conditions in Article 17(2)(a)-(c) must be 
established and the ICC should judge these through the lens of 
“principles of due process recognized by international law.”150 
Each of the Article 17(2)(a)-(c) requirements contains language 
which makes due process irrelevant to admissibility unless it 
makes the defendant more difficult to convict, as noted 
above.151 
 
 143. Rome State, supra note 8, art. 17(2)(c), at 12 (emphasis added). 
 144. Heller, supra note 65, at 261.  
 145. Id.  
 146. See Pichon, supra note 33, at 193 (pointing out that Article 17(2)(c) 
only applies to national proceedings which aim to make the accused harder to 
convict). See also Heller, supra note 65, at 260–61. 
 147. Heller, supra note 65, at 261. 
 148. Id. at 262. 
 149. Id. at 262–63.  
 150. Id. 
 151. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(2)(a), at 12 (unwillingness is 
found if the proceedings were undertaken “for the purpose of shielding the 
person concerned from criminal responsibility”); id. art. 17(2)(b), at 12 
(unwillingness is found if there has been an unjustified delay “inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”); id. art. 17(2)(c), at 12 
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A Due Process Theory based on the Article 17(3) “inability” 
determination is likewise flawed.152 To declare a State “unable” 
to investigate or prosecute a case, the ICC “shall consider 
whether due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability 
of its national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings.”153 A judicial system that is 
missing due process guarantees is not one that has collapsed or 
is no longer able to obtain the defendant, evidence, or 
testimony.154 The “inability” determination more appropriately 
applies in situations where an investigation or prosecution is 
not practically possible.155 The Informal Expert Paper written 
by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor confirms this 
interpretation, listing factors such as a lack of judges or 
investigators, a lack of judicial infrastructure, or a lack of 
access as being relevant to a determination of “inability.”156 
Therefore, “inability” is satisfied only by a collapse of 
unavailability that prevents an effective investigation or 
prosecution, not a collapse that prevents a fair investigation or 
prosecution.157 In conclusion, no matter what basis the Due 
Process Theory is rooted in, “the principle of complementarity 
only addresses situations where breaches of human rights 
standards, more precisely the right to an independent and 
impartial judiciary, work in favour of the accused.”158   
Therefore, as much as one may hope that Libya’s due 
process violations would automatically make Saif’s case 
admissible before the ICC, a plain reading of the text of Article 
 
(unwillingness is found if the proceedings were conducted in a manner 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”). See also 
KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 130 (“Article 17(2) addresses the situation in 
which criminal processes are abused to the benefit of the suspect or accused. 
This is diametrically opposed to the general assumption and objective of fair 
trial guarantees, which are designed to protect individuals against abuses to 
their disadvantage.” (emphasis in original)). 
 152. Heller, supra note 65, at 263.  
 153. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(3), at 12. 
 154. Id. at 264.  
 155. Id. (“[T]he ordinary meaning . . . seems to embrace only (relatively) 
objective criteria such as a political situation that makes holding trials 
impossible or a debilitating lack of judges, prosecutors, and other court 
personnel.”).  
 156. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-01/04-01/07-AnxA, Informal 
Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, ¶ 50 (2003),  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf. 
 157. Pichon, supra note 33, at 192. 
 158. Id. at 194.  
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17 does not support this proposition. Despite Libya’s devotion of 
much of their Admissibility Challenge to persuading the ICC 
that they will provide Saif with the due process guarantees 
afforded to him under Libyan law, Libya’s Challenge is 
fundamentally based on the notion that Article 17 does not 
make an absence of national due process a ground for 
admissibility.159 The Challenge points out:  
“[T]here is a danger that the provisions of 
Article 17 will become a tool for overly harsh 
assessments of the judicial machinery in 
developing countries.” It is not the function of 
the ICC to hold Libya’s national legal system 
against an exacting and elaborate standard 
beyond that basically required for a fair trial.160 
The Libyan Admissibility Challenge further recognizes that 
both the drafters of the Rome Statute and commentators have 
noted that: 
Arguments have been made that the Court is 
thus given a general role in monitoring the 
human rights standards of domestic authorities. 
The better view is that delay and lack of 
independence are relevant only in so far as 
either of them indicates an intention to shield 
the person concerned from justice. There does 
not appear to be anything in the Statute to make 
the Court responsible for the protection of the 
human rights of the accused in the national 
enforcement of international criminal law . . . .161 
As explained above, Libya is correct in its assertion that 
Article 17 does not allow the ICC to declare a case admissible 
solely on the grounds that the Libyan judicial system lacks due 
process guarantees. To hold otherwise would invite the ICC to 
act as a supranational court, scrutinizing national judicial 
courts for violations of international due process guarantees.162 
 
 159. Heller, supra note 66. See Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶ 
99. 
 160. Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶ 99 (quoting Sharon A. 
Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 624(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d 
ed. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Id. (quoting ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 156–57 (2d. ed. 2010)).  
 162. See Chibueze, supra note 26, at 196 (discussing how the court would 
be viewed as a vestige of western countries by developing countries if the court 
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This was not the intention of the drafters of the Rome Statute 
for the ICC. In fact, the delegates to the Rome Conference 
specifically rejected a draft version of Articles 17 that would 
have allowed a consideration of whether “the said 
investigations or proceedings. . .were or are conducted with full 
respect for the fundamental rights of the accused.”163 As such, 
the ICC should not use a lack of national due process as the 
only grounds for admissibility of a case before it, no matter the 
unpleasant implications that may follow. 
 
B. LIBYA’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE SAIF WITH DUE PROCESS 
GUARANTEES IS INCONSISTENT WITH AN INTENT TO BRING 
HIM TO JUSTICE 
Despite the fact that a lack of national due process on its 
own does not establish admissibility, Libya’s inability to 
provide Saif with foundational due process rights remains 
relevant for the admissibility of the case. When a national 
criminal justice system has its own due process requirements, 
and those requirements are violated during the investigation or 
prosecution process, a State has made it more difficult to 
convict the defendant because any conviction could be 
overturned on appeal based on the due process violations.164 If 
a denial of basic due process rights guaranteed under national 
law means that the charges must be dismissed, and the 
defendant has in fact been denied of those guarantees, then 
proceedings have been “conducted in a manner which . . . is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.”165 In these circumstances, therefore, the Article 
 
required the kind of procedural guarantees present in western countries). 
 163. Heller, supra note 65, at 272 (“Because many delegations believed 
that procedural fairness should not be a ground for defining complementarity, 
[the] proposal was defeated. In the view of the delegations, the purpose of 
paragraph 2 [of Article 17] was to preclude the possibility of sham trials aimed 
at shielding perpetrators – and nothing more.”) (quoting John T. Holmes, The 
Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE 
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS, 41, 50 (Roy 
S. Lee Ed., 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 164. See Kevin Jon Heller, Why the Failure to Provide Saif with Due 
Process is Relevant to Libya’s Admissibility Challenge, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 2, 
2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/08/02/why-the-failure-to-provide-saif-with-
due-process-is-relevant-to-libyas-admissibility-challenge.  
 165. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(2)(c), at 12. See Heller, supra note 
164 (promulgating the idea that the State’s failure to provide a suspect with 
due process rights demanded by national law means that the State is 
conducting the proceedings in a manner which will make it more difficult to 
bring the accused to justice). 
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17(2)(c) requirements for declaring a State “unwilling” would be 
met and a case would be admissible before the ICC.166 
The reports from the OPCD, Amnesty International and 
other international organizations, and even Libya’s 
Admissibility Challenge itself, show that these are the 
circumstances surrounding Libya’s investigation and 
prosecution of Saif. Libyan authorities are constitutionally 
required to give Saif due process protections and they have 
denied him of those protections.167 Therefore, it is likely that 
any conviction would be overturned. Libya’s blatant disregard 
for Saif’s constitutional due process rights has made it 
impossible to secure a conviction that will withstand an 
appeal.168 As such, Libya’s actions have (albeit unintentionally) 
demonstrated an unwillingness to investigate or prosecute 
because they have conducted the investigation in a manner 
which is inconsistent with an intent to bring Saif to justice, 
violating Article 17(2)(c). Because of Libya’s ongoing violations 
of Article 17(2)(c), the ICC should declare the case admissible 
and guarantee that Saif receives a fair trial at The Hague. 
As mentioned above, Libya spends considerable time in the 
Admissibility Challenge describing Libyan law and the due 
process guarantees provided to Saif under domestic law.169 Also 
included in the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure are 
provisions specifying the consequences of noncompliance with 
these fundamental guarantees. For example, Article 304 
demands that the “breach of any disposition of law concerning 
essential procedures gives rise to the nullity of the procedure.”170 
Article 305(1) requires that the “breach of a provision 
concerning the composition of the tribunal, his functions, his 
competence in the qualification of the crime or, in any case, any 
matter related to public order gives rise to nullity.”171 Article 
309 specifies that “the declaration that a certain procedure is 
 
 166. See Heller, supra note 164.  
 167. See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 126; Prosecutor v. Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Public 
Redacted Version of the Corrigendum to the “Defence Response to the 
‘Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of 
the ICC Statute’”, ¶ 75 (July 31, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1446165.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Defence 
Response]. 
 168. See Heller, supra note 161.  
 169. See Admissibility Challenge, supra note 98, ¶¶ 39–67. 
 170. Defence Response, supra note 167, ¶ 217. 
 171. Id. (emphasis added).   
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null, also affects any consequences of that procedure.”172 The 
existence of these provisions means that a violation of the due 
process rights afforded to Saif under Libyan domestic law 
should lead to a nullity of the procedure. For Libyan domestic 
courts to hold otherwise would be an indication of the lack of 
independence or impartiality of the judiciary.173 
Unfortunately, Libya’s treatment of Saif thus far violates 
not only international law but Libyan law as well. The OPCD’s 
response to the Admissibility Challenge is riddled with 
examples of breaches of Saif’s fundamental due process rights 
guaranteed by Libyan law.174 Any one of these breaches is 
grounds for Libyan domestic courts to declare that an essential 
provision of the law was not followed, thereby necessitating 
that they dismiss the case against Saif.175 Not only are these 
violations alleged by the OPCD, but they are confirmed by 
respected international organizations.176 Saif’s lack of access to 
a lawyer is just an example of one such confirmed violation. 
During the investigation phase of the case, the phase Saif 
remains in, Article 106 of the Libyan Criminal Procedure Code 
provides that Saif has a right to an attorney both in 
interrogations with the investigator and when being confronted 
with witnesses.177 Despite this right, Human Rights Watch,178 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Heller, supra note 164.  
 174. See Defence Response, supra note 167, ¶ 6 (conveying Saif’s 
statements that he has not been allowed to speak with an attorney to prepare 
his defense); id. ¶ 75 (noting that Saif has not been provided with the evidence 
or basis for his detention); id. ¶ 91 (asserting that Libya’s reliance on intercept 
evidence of Saif’s guilt without a court order is a violation of Libyan law); id. ¶ 
95 (describing how witness statements obtained through torture or by suspects 
denied council are excluded from proceedings under Libyan law); id. ¶¶ 107–
115 (listing the names of Libyan witnesses that have been tortured, 
interrogated without counsel, and detained in violation of their rights); id. ¶ 
182 (noting that both the Human Rights Watch and the U.N. Commission of 
Inquiry have confirmed that Saif has not been brought before a judge or 
allowed an opportunity to dispute his detention, violating Libyan law); id. ¶ 
188 (alleging that Saif has not been detained in a proper purpose built facility 
as demanded by the Libyan Prisons Act); id. ¶¶ 194–97 (describing Libya’s 
denial to the OPCD of contact with Saif as his attorney); id. ¶¶ 200, 207 
(asserting that Saif has been denied access to legal advice). 
 175. Id. ¶ 91.  
 176. See Fred Abrahams, In His First Interviews, Saif al-Islam Says He 
Has Not Been Given Access to a Lawyer, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 30, 2011, 4:45 
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/30/in-his-first-interview-
saif-al-islam-says-he-has-not-been-given-access-to-a-lawyer.html.  
 177. Compilation of Libyan Law, supra note 122, art. 106 (“In any other 
case except Flagrante delicto, and in case of haste or fear of evidence loss, 
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the U.N. International Commission on Libya,179 the OPCD,180 
and Saif himself181 have complained about Libya’s disregard for 
this due process guarantee. The overwhelming evidence that 
Saif has been denied access to legal representation is but one 
example of Libya’s failure to provide due process guarantees to 
Saif which are demanded by its own domestic law. 
Therefore, “by continuing to deny Saif even the semblance 
of due process, the Libyan government is making it almost 
impossible for the Libyan judiciary to allow the charges to 
proceed against him.”182 As the Defence Response notes, an 
application of Libyan domestic law in an impartial and 
independent manner would necessarily lead to a finding that 
the proceedings to date have “flagrantly violated Mr. Gaddafi’s 
rights, and have failed to comply with fundamental tenets of 
the law.”183 A finding of this nature “would frustrate the ability 
of the domestic authorities to bring Mr. Gaddafi to ‘justice’” as 
it would mean that the proceedings against him were null.184 
This action inevitably is “inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the person concerned [Saif] to justice” and therefore, warrants 
a determination by the ICC that Libya is “unwilling” to 
genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution of Saif.185 
 
investigator may not interrogate any accused or confront him with other 
accused persons or witnesses except after summoning his lawyer to appear, if 
any, and the accused shall announce the name of his lawyer with a report 
submitted to the clerk office or prison warden, his lawyer may handle such 
statement or announcement.”). 
 178. See Abrahams, supra note 176 (confirming that Saif has been left in 
total isolation without any access to legal consultation). 
 179. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Libya, ¶ 
787, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (March 2, 2012) (“Until now he [Saif] has been 
held by thuwar in Zintan, without any access to a layer or to his family.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 180. See Defence Response, supra note 167, ¶ 196 (“[T]he OPCD was 
informed that it would not be possible for Mr. Gaddafi to have privileged 
communications with a lawyer, whilst he is being detained in Zintan”); Walt, 
supra note 106 (“[Melinda] Taylor [Saif’s OPCD counsel] said Libya has denied 
Saif access to meet with lawyers, regarded as a basic right under international 
law. ‘We have not had any ability to contact Mr. Gaddafi and none of his 
friends and family have been able to contact him’ . . . .”). 
 181. See Defence Response, supra note 167, ¶ 6 (“There will be no truth if I 
[Saif] am kept locked up and silenced in a remote mountain village, with no or 
very limited possibility to speak to my lawyers in order to convey my 
defense.”). 
 182. Heller, supra note 165. 
 183. Defence Response, supra note 167, ¶ 216. 
 184. Id. ¶ 218. 
 185. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(2)(c), at 12; id. 
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C. THE NEXT STEPS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
Unfortunately, even a determination that Saif’s case is 
admissible before the ICC does not guarantee Libya will 
surrender Saif to the jurisdiction of the Court. Because the 
situation is before the ICC on a referral from the Security 
Council, if Libya refuses to surrender Saif after an 
admissibility finding the ICC may issue a finding of non-
compliance under Article 87 and inform the Security Council.186 
Although not required to take any action, the Security Council 
could potentially invoke a number of responses from issuing a 
resolution or presidential statement to invoking sanctions of 
the country have the potential of being incredibly damaging to 
a country trying to regain its footing after having been ravished 
by 42 years of Gaddafi-era rule and over a year of civil war.187   
Regardless of what steps are taken to guarantee that Saif 
is surrendered to the ICC, it is clear that a finding of 
admissibility is warranted in this situation. While Saif will 
surely face justice before Libyan courts, it will come at the cost 
of denying him access to any semblance of a fair trial.188 
Although the primary goal of the ICC is to end impunity and 
bring those guilty of the most serious human rights violations 
 
17(1)(a), at 12.  Recent developments indicate that Libya may also be “unable” 
to genuinely carry out the prosecution because they have yet to obtain custody 
of Saif. Since his arrest on November 19, 2011, Saif has remained in militia 
custody in Zintan. Art. 17(3) is clear that a State is unable to prosecute if it is 
unable to obtain custody of the accused due to a total or substantial collapse of 
its national judicial system and to date, Libya has be unable to show that it 
has the ability to do so. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(3), at 14; 
Kevin Jon Heller, Is Libya “Able” to Obtain Saif?, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 23, 
2013), http://www.opiniojuris.org/2013/02/23/is-libya-able-to-obtain-saif/; 
Kevin Jon Heller, The OTP Makes a Serious Legal Error Concerning Libya 
and Saif, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 14, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/14/the-
otp-makes-a-serious-legal-error-concerning-libya-and-saif/.  
 186. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 87(5)(b), at 52 (“Where a State 
not a party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or 
an agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with requests pursuant to any 
such arrangement or agreement, the court may so inform the Assembly of 
State Parties, or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, 
the Security Council.”) 
 187. Libya: Q&A on the ICC and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, supra note 92. 
 188. See Heller, supra note 66 (“I don’t know many people who work in 
[International Criminal Law] who actually believe that Libya intends to give 
Saif and Al-Senussi trials that comport with international standards of due 
process, regardless of its protestations to the contrary.”). 
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to justice, 189 this goal should not be pursued without regard to 
due process. If the ICC surrenders jurisdiction to Libya and 
Saif ends up facing a sham trial and quick execution, the ICC 
stands to be viewed as an ineffective international judicial body 
capable of doing little to supplement domestic judicial systems. 
As Saif himself said:  
There will . . . be no truth if witnesses are faced 
with possible life sentences for simply testifying 
in my favor, there is no security or protection for 
them, nor any consequences if these witnesses 
are threatened and killed. There will certainly 
be no justice in this case, if the prosecution is 
based on evidence extracted from torture and 
other inadmissible evidence, or persons who are 
too scared to say the truth. I am not afraid to die 
but if you execute me after such a trial you 
should just call it murder and be done with it.190 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The principle of complementarity woven throughout the 
structure of the ICC demands that the ICC surrender 
jurisdiction to national courts that are actively engaged in 
investigating or prosecuting a case. Unfortunately, as is 
evidenced by the situation surrounding the cases of Saif and al-
Senussi in Libya, this can mean surrendering jurisdiction to a 
national court that has no meaningful due process guarantees 
for the accused. The ICC and the international community 
must accept this premise as true and make appropriate 
amendments to the Rome Statute to account for flagrant due 
process violations if the ICC is to retain its legitimacy in the 
international judicial realm.   
Fortunately, the case of Saif presents an interesting 
opportunity for the ICC to circumvent its complementarity 
provision and ensure that Saif is brought to justice while being 
afforded internationally recognized standards of due process. 
However unintentional, Libya’s blatant disregard for Saif’s due 
process rights violates not only international due process 
standards, but also due process rights guaranteed to Saif under 
Libyan domestic law. As such, Libya’s conduct has made it 
 
 189. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, at 2 (“Determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes . . . .”).  
 190. See Defence Response, supra note 167, ¶¶ 6–8. 
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more difficult for a Libyan domestic court to convict Saif and 
therefore, meets the Article 17(2) requirements for the ICC to 
declare Libya “unwilling” to prosecute. The ICC has proper 
grounds to deem Saif’s case admissible and must do so if it is to 
retain its legitimacy as a court of international significance.  
 
